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I. INTRODUCTION 
The present section of this text is aptly titled “New Interests, New Shareholder 
Constellations, New Landscapes”.  As interests, arrangements and landscapes are constantly 
formed and reformed in the contemporary business corporation, another manifestation of 
newness becomes apparent – new tensions.   
In various respects, tension serves as a key motif in the work of Karl Polanyi, whose 
famous concept of “embeddedness” informs the chapters in this collection.1  Polanyi illustrates 
the existence of society and the market in a state of “related tension”.2   The latter is embedded 
within the former and in order to protect against the risks that follow self-interested gain, 
“market societies must construct elaborate rules and institutional structures”.3  This engages the 
“double movement” thesis.  As the negative consequences of economic activity become more 
pronounced, protective reactions are catalyzed that seek to resist efforts to decontextualize the 
economy from societal institutions.4  Block discusses these themes by invoking the image of a 
rubber band.  Attempts to enhance market sovereignty raise the degree of tension as the band is 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.  I wish to express my thanks to Obi Okafor, 
Sara Seck, Catherine Coumans and Michael Fakhri and to acknowledge, with appreciation, the research assistance 
of Jessica DiFederico and the editorial assistance of Chad Travis. 
1 While Polanyi’s seminal text – “The Great Transformation” – did not explicitly accentuate this idea, it firmly 
planted the conceptual seeds.  See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944) at 68 (“...never before our own time were markets more than accessories of 
economic life.  As a rule the economic system was absorbed in the social system...”).  See also Bernard Barber, “All 
Economies are “Embedded”: The Career of a Concept, and Beyond” (1995) 62 Social Research 387 at 401 and Fred 
Block, “Karl Polanyi and the Writing of The Great Transformation” (2003) 32 Theory and Society 275 at 276. 
2 Mark Banks, “Karl Polanyi, The Rubberband Man” (12 December 2008), online: 
http://www.open2.net/blogs/society/index.php/2008/12/12/karl-polanyi-the-rubberband-man?blog=10 
3 Block, supra note 1 at 297. 
4 Polanyi, supra note 1 at 76 (“While on the one hand markets spread all over the face of the globe...on the other 
hand a network of measures and policies was integrated into powerful institutions designed to check the action of 
the market...Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system...”). 
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stretched.  As this elongation continues, the band will eventually break (i.e. social dissolution) or 
retract (i.e. the market will go back to an embedded state).5    
At its core, this analytical structure is concerned with the state necessarily imposing a 
regulatory and institutional framework that   constricts unbridled market movements, thereby 
docking the market in the “moral fabric of society.”6  This approach has obvious applicability to 
contemporary debates surrounding globalization, deregulation and the global financial crisis.  In 
this chapter, I explore another issue of current importance.  The expansion of Canadian 
extractive corporations’ overseas business operations has led to concerns regarding human 
rights-related impacts.  As these apprehensions grow, we see a countervailing rise in calls for 
government intervention7 and in levels of socially conscious shareholder advocacy.   
I focus on the latter as manifested in recent use of the shareholder proposal mechanism 
found in Canadian corporate law.  Shareholder proposals, while under-theorized, provide a 
valuable lens through which to consider the argument that economic behaviour is embedded 
within social relations.  In doing so, I situate my analysis within Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) scholarship.8  Indeed, it seems particularly fitting to establish 
linkages between the concept of “embeddedness” and TWAIL literature given Polanyi’s seething 
indictment of the colonial encounter and his contention that the forced adoption of market 
economies led to the “rapid and violent disruption of the basic institutions” of the Third World.9   
Elsewhere, I have supported the use of corporate law tools in advancing the international 
human rights enterprise and argued that investment activism can be an essential component of 
                                                 
5 Fred Block, “Introduction” in Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of 
Our Time, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) at xxv. 
6 Jens Beckert, “The Great Transformation of Embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology” 
(2007) MPIfG Discussion Paper 07/1 at 8, online:  
<http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp07-1.pdf>. 
7 See, for example, Bill C-300, Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas Corporations in Developing 
Countries Act, 2nd Session, 40th Parliament, 57-58 Elizabeth II (2009), online:  
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3658424&Language=e&Mode=1&File=24#1
>. 
8 The use of the term “Third World” in this context is meant to include “the group of states and peoples who ‘self-
identify’ as such.”  See O.C. Okafor, “Marxian Embraces and De-couplings in Upendra Baxi’s Human Rights 
Scholarship: A Case Study” in S. Marks, ed., International Law on the Left (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 253, n. 4.  
9 Polanyi, supra note 1 at 159.  For more on this point, see M. Fakhri, “Law as the Interplay of Ideas, Institutions, 
and Interests: Using Polyani (and Foucault) to ask TWAIL Questions” (2008) 10 International Community Law 
Review 455 at 460 – 461. 
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this advancement.10  This chapter represents a reflexive pause.  I seek to problematize the 
shareholder proposal as a human rights advocacy tool and to examine it as a site of contestation. 
 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSAL STRUCTURE 
 
  The shareholder proposal structure in corporate law provides equity holders with the 
ability to compel management to hold a shareholder vote on issues the proponent considers 
salient.  Shareholder-commenced proposals are a novel implement in the overall corporate law 
tool shed, as they allow the investor to trigger activity and investor-to-firm dialogue, rather than 
passively absorbing the actions of management.  The proposal mechanism is not meant to 
appropriate management’s authority, but to “provide shareholders with the opportunity to 
express their views on issues affecting their corporation...”11 and to allow them “to hold 
management accountable for its actions and to influence future business decisions by having a 
public forum in which to challenge management.”12  In terms of procedure, the firm is obligated 
to include a proposal in the management proxy circular materials.13 Shareholders then consider 
the proposal before a vote at an annual or special meeting.   
 
  The company, however, is excused from the requirement to circulate a proposal if a 
substantive ground for exclusion is present or if particular procedural requirements are not 
adhered to.14  In the U.S., recent developments indicate a regulatory momentum towards curbing 
shareholder rights of expression.15  The Canadian experience has been quite different.  In 2001, 
the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) underwent substantial revision.  Of particular 
relevance is an amendment that altered when the firm can lawfully refuse to circulate a proposal 
on substantive grounds.  Prior to 2001, the law allowed exclusion if the proposal was submitted 
                                                 
10 Aaron A. Dhir, “Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving 
Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability” (2006) 43:2 American Business Law Journal 365 [Dhir, 
“Realigning”], Aaron A. Dhir, “The Politics of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice 
and Human Rights” forthcoming in (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 1 [Dhir, “The Politics”]. 
11 Thomas A. DeCapo, “Challenging Objectionable Animal Treatment with the Shareholder Proxy Proposal Rule” 
(1988) University of Illinois Law Review 119 at 138. 
12 Ibid. at 138 - 39.  The proposal mechanism is an alternative to simply raising an issue from the meeting floor, 
which “often gets a nonresponsive reply...[and] [e]ven if [the shareholder’s] question is answered...his efforts will 
generate as much noise as a tree falling in an uninhabited forest.”  See Donald E. Schwartz & Elliott J. Weiss, “An 
Assessment of the SEC Shareholder Proposal Rule” (1977) 65 Georgetown Law Journal 635 at 641. 
13 Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-44, ss. 137(2).   
14 Dhir, “Realigning”, supra note 10 at 385 – 390. 
15 See the recent “Save Shareholder Rights” Campaign, a joint initiative of the Social Investment Forum and the 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which sought to prevent various regulatory changes proposed by the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in “Shareholder Proposals”, 17 C.F.R. Part 240 (27 July 2007), online:  
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2007/34-56160.pdf>. 
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‘‘by the shareholder primarily for the purpose of…promoting general economic, political, racial, 
religious, social or similar causes.’’16  Under the new test, exclusion is permitted where it 
“clearly appears that the proposal does not relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of 
the corporation.”17  
 
   The post-amendment period has seen a marked increase in use of the proposal 
mechanism with respect to issues of corporate governance and human 
rights/environmental/social policy.18  Taking the latter as an example, in 2001 – the year of the 
amendments – just two social responsibility-related shareholder proposals were submitted to 
Canadian firms.19  This was the case again in 2002.20  However, from 2003 – 2006, the numbers 
increased to thirteen,21 eleven,22 twenty-five23 and twenty-eight.24  In the 2007 and 2008 proxy 
seasons, there was a striking spike in the use of proposals as a means of advancing human rights 
issues.  My analysis of data compiled by the Shareholder Association for Research and 
Education reveals that in these years investors submitted approximately forty-six and forty-two 
proposals, respectively, to Canadian firms.  The general upward rise can be represented 
approximately as follows: 
                                                 
16 CBCA, supra note 13 (prior to the 2001 amendments). 
17 CBCA, supra note 13, ss. 137(5)(b.1). 
18 This trend has occurred in other jurisdictions as well.  See T. Guay, J. Doh & G. Sinclair, “Non-Governmental 
Organizations, Shareholder Activism, and Socially Responsible Investments: Ethical, Strategic, and Governance 
Implications” (2004) 52 Journal of Business Ethics 125. 
19 Benjamin J. Richardson, “Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for Canadian Environmental Law” 
(2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 145 at 183. 
20 Social Investment Organization, “Canadian Social and Environmental Resolutions Reach 13 This Year, Up from 
Two in 2002”, online:  
<http://www.socialinvestment.ca/News&Archives/news-803-Canadian.htm>. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Social Investment Organization, “Socially Responsible Shareholder Proposals Double in 2005; Climate Change, 
Human Rights Leading Issues”, online:  
<www.socialinvestment.ca/News&Archives/news-305-ShareholderProposals.htm>. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Social Investment Organization, “Canadian SRI Investors File 28 Social and Environmental Shareholder 
Proposals with Canadian Firms”, online: 
<www.socialinvestment.ca/News&Archives/news-0306-Shareholderproposals.htm>. 
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  Human rights in Burma,25 human rights in China,26 aboriginal land claims,27 gender 
diversity,28 biodiversity protection,29 climate change risk and related disclosure30 – these are just 
some of the topical issues that have been broached in Canadian shareholder resolutions.  Should 
this trend of using the corporation as an arena for political discourse be viewed in a positive or 
negative light?  The answer, of course, depends on the perspective from which we consider the 
issue.  For economic theorists, the very existence of the proposal mechanism is a peculiarity.  As 
Professor Lee observes:  
 
…for many opponents of social shareholder proposals, the shareholder proposal 
mechanism itself (never mind proposals directed at social responsibility) seems 
anomalous.  For one thing, the mechanism is in tension with the separation of 
ownership and control, which economic theorists of the corporation believe 
                                                 
25 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1368>. 
26 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: < 
http://share.ca/en/node/888>. 
27 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/587>. 
28 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: < 
http://share.ca/en/node/483>. 
29 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: < 
http://share.ca/en/node/868>. 
30 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1320>,<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1322>, 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1324>, <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1384>, 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1386> and <http://www.share.ca/en/node/1389>. 
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produces gains through the specialization of functions.  Moreover, shareholders 
have no reason to vote on a shareholder proposal, or for that matter any other 
matter submitted to shareholders, since they rationally have no expectation that 
their vote will be pivotal.  For both of these reasons, economic theorists of the 
corporation typically have difficulty accounting for the existence of a shareholder 
proposal mechanism.31 
 
Beyond academic puzzlement, particular commentators view proposals as a tool used “chiefly by 
time-worn gadflies…unable to achieve their ends through legitimate political mechanisms”32 that 
threaten to “lead management to be less inclined to pursue shareholder wealth 
maximization…”33  Correspondingly, some have called for the abolition of the mechanism.34   
 
If, however, we view the proposal structure in light of social movement theory, we find a 
different set of considerations at play.  While the study of social movement activity has typically 
been preoccupied with the public realm, scholars of late have turned their attention to the private, 
analyzing the relationship between social mobilization and corporate operations.35  In particular, 
the literature reveals an increasing interest in how strategically focused activism informs 
organizational development.36  Den Hond and DeBakker note that reformative activist groups 
seeking to influence the levels and content of corporate social responsibility may prefer to rely 
on participatory modes of engagement in attempting to gain leverage over targeted businesses.37  
In doing so, such groups must position their issues in a manner that clearly demonstrates their 
value and relevance to the firm in question.  This may be accomplished through illustrating the 
                                                 
31 Ian Lee, “Corporate Law, Profit Maximization and the ‘Responsible’ Shareholder” (2005) 10 Stanford Journal of 
Law, Business & Finance 31 at 63 – 64 (citations omitted). 
32 George W. Dent, Jr., “Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose: A Reply to Professor Ryan” (1989) 23 Georgia 
Law Review 815 at 820.  See also David Vogel, Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenges to Business 
Authority (New York: Basic Books, 1978) at 208ff. 
33 Alan R. Palmiter, “The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation” (1993) 45 Alabama 
Law Review 879 at 899.  See also Roberta Romano, “Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance” (2001) 18 Yale Journal on Regulation 174 at 186, n. 30 (“Social 
responsibility proposals are not a focus of this article because they are not advanced in order to improve corporate 
performance and are consequently, not compatible with the objective of U.S. corporate law, which is to maximize 
share value.”) and Henry G. Manne, “Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent” (1972) 24 Stanford 
Law Review 481. 
34 Susan W. Liebeler, “A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule” (1984) 18 Georgia Law Review 425 
at 426 – 427 (“[b]ecause it is an unwise and unwarranted intrusion into private transactions, private markets, and 
state corporation law, the rule should be rescinded”). 
35 Erin Marie Reid & Michael W. Toffel, “Responding to Public and Private Politics: Corporate Disclosure of 
Climate Change Strategies” (18 August 2008) at 8, online:  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1237982> (citations omitted). 
36 Ibid. at 9 (citations omitted). 
37 Frank Den Hond & Frank G. A. DeBakker, “Ideologically Motivated Activism: How Activist Groups Influence 
Corporate Social Change Activities” (2007) 32:3 Academy of Management Review 901 at 911. 
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potential for “material and symbolic gain”; in other words, through establishing pecuniary 
advantage or the possibility of enhanced reputational capital.38  I will return to this idea in more 
detail below.     
 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS  
 
When considering shareholder proposals as part of a rights-based advocacy strategy, it is 
important to note the dialogue that arises between investors and corporate management.  The 
former’s concerns are expressed to management via the proposal’s submission.  This should be 
viewed less as an adversarial expression and more as the initiation of a conversation on issues of 
mutual concern. 
 
While arguably a “lower profile tactic”39, proposals have the potential to yield enormous 
gains for the proponent.  There is accumulating evidence “suggest[ing] that today’s proposals 
may become tomorrow’s corporate policy”.40  In other words, through the submission process, 
and the resulting dialogue between the investor and the firm, the formulation of corporate policy 
relating to human rights issues has been transformed.41  In certain cases, investors have 
withdrawn proposals after conducting successful negotiations with management.  I have 
previously canvassed several examples of this trend, which I have viewed in a positive light.42  
Another, more recent, proposal43 serves as a useful example of serious difficulties that arise 
when employing proposals in the human rights sphere; as such, this example merits unpacking.   
   
  In 2008, a consortium of investors44 submitted a proposal to Vancouver-based Goldcorp 
Inc.  Goldcorp, one of the largest global gold mining companies, has received scathing critique 
                                                 
38 Ibid. at 915. 
39 K. Rehbein, S. Waddock & S.B. Graves, “Understanding Shareholder Activism: Which Corporations are 
Targeted?” (2004) 43 Business and Society 239 at 240. 
40 Janis Sarra, “Shareholders as Winners and Losers under the Amended Canada Business Corporations Act” (2003) 
39 Canadian Business Law Journal 52 at 74 – 75.  
41 See J.M. Logsdon & H. J. Van Buren III, “Beyond the Proxy Vote: Dialogues between Shareholder Activists and 
Corporations” (2009) 87 Journal of Business Ethics 353 at 353 (“The phenomenon of Dialogue between a 
corporation and dissident shareholders has not been analyzed in the academic literature ...because it occurs behind 
the scenes ...Yet this is where a great deal of social change initiated by shareholder activists is negotiated”). 
42 Dhir, “Realigning”, supra note 10 at 405 – 407. 
43 I have also considered this proposal favorably.  Dhir, “The Politics”, supra note 10 at 27 – 28. 
44 The Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff Pension Fund, the Ethical Funds Company, the First Swedish 
National Pension Fund and the Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund. 
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pertaining to the ecological and human rights impacts of its overseas operations.45  As a result of 
such concerns, Jantzi Research recently recommended that Goldcorp “be considered ineligible 
for [socially responsible investment] portfolios.”46  The consortium requested that Goldcorp’s 
Board commit to an independent human rights impact assessment of the firm’s practices in 
Guatemala (in particular, with regard to the Marlin Mine in the western highlands).47  Human 
rights impact assessments are a relatively new tool that allow a firm “to systematically identify, 
predict and respond to the potential human rights impacts of a business project”.48  The proposal 
was subsequently withdrawn after Goldcorp agreed to commission such an assessment.49   
 
At one level, this development might be heralded as a milestone in corporate 
accountability engagement as it is unprecedented for a Canadian corporation to undertake an 
impact assessment focusing on human rights.50  This is particularly important in the context of 
the Canadian extractive industry.  Canada has listed on its stock exchanges more mining firms 
than any other state.51  Globally, Canadian exchanges represent “the world’s largest source of 
equity capital for mining exploration and production both in Canada and abroad.”52  However, 
United Nations treaty monitoring bodies, academics, civil society groups and parliamentarians53 
have all impugned the Canadian extractive sector for the deleterious human rights-related 
repercussions of its overseas operations. 
                                                 
45 See, for example, Rights Action, “Investing in Conflict: Public Money, Private Gain – Goldcorp in the Americas” 
(2008), online: <http://www.rightsaction.org/Reports/research.pdf> and Shin Imai, Ladan Mehranvar, & Jennifer 
Sander, “Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala” (2007) 6 Indigenous Law Journal 101.  
46 Jantzi Research Client Alert, “Jantzi Research Recommends Goldcorp as Ineligible for SRI Portfolios” (30 April 
2008) at 1. 
47 For recent accounts of local resistance to Goldcorp’s operations in Guatemala, see Andy Hoffman, “Goldcorp 
Bested by Mayan Mother” The Globe and Mail (10 July 2008) B1 and Dawn Paley, “Goldcorp: Occupation and 
Resistance in Guatemala (and Beyond)” The Dominion (21 June 2008), online:  The Dominion  
<http://www.dominionpaper.ca/weblogs/dawn/1887>. 
48 International Finance Corporation, “Guide to Human Rights Impact Assessment and Management - Executive 
Overview” (2007) at 5, online: 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ref_SocialResponsibility_HRIA_ExecutiveOvervi
ew/$FILE/HRIAexecsummary.pdf>.  
49 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1461>. 
50 Investors Spur Goldcorp to Address Human Rights In Guatemala” (24 April 2008), online: 
<www.newswire.ca/fr/releases/archive/April2008/24/c9323.html?view=print>. 
51 National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing 
Countries, “Advisory Group Report” (29 March 2007) at 3, online:  
<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/Advisory%20Group%20Report%20-%20March%202007.pdf>.   
52 Ibid.  For a discussion of the increased presence of Canadian mining firms in Latin America generally, see G. J. 
Munarriz, “Rhetoric and Reality: The World Bank Development Policies, Mining Corporations, and Indigenous 
Communities in Latin America” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 431 at 440 (citations omitted). 
53 Dhir, “The Politics”, supra note 10 at 6 (citations omitted). 
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  Further, beyond the end result of the impact assessment itself, there is value to be derived 
from the process of contemplating and selecting an assessment methodology.  After the 
proposal’s withdrawal, the consortium worked in concert with Goldcorp to design a procedure.54  
The proposal’s text also specifically references the assessment methodology created by Canadian 
organization Rights & Democracy.55  Rights & Democracy’s impact assessment framework 
involves ten steps that include, for example, ascertaining the human rights context in the state 
that will host the proposed investment; seeking expert views on relevant human rights 
challenges; data collection, such as interviewing community members, government officials, 
corporate representatives and workers; the formulation of a draft report to be commented on by 
all relevant parties; establishing a set of conclusions and suitable corrective measures; and 
monitoring/continuing assessment.56  The process of appraising these sorts of methodologies and 
working through how they can best be integrated into business operations will undoubtedly be 
educative for corporate management and will assist it in developing a fluency in human rights 
concepts and techniques.57 
 
That being said, there is also cause for very serious concern.  After its inception, the 
consortium’s proposal generated intense controversy.  The controversy orginated not from 
detractors of the shareholder proposal mechanism or the business community; rather, it stemmed 
from Canadian human rights players and from Guatemalan communities.  An early critique was 
advanced by non-governmental organization Rights Action: 
 
While the original shareholder resolution may have been proposed with good 
intentions, we believe it will harm and undermine the clearly stated demands and 
positions of the Goldcorp-affected indigenous communities and may result in a 
whitewashing public relations exercise that only benefits Goldcorp and company 
shareholders and investors.58      
 
MiningWatch Canada subsequently adopted and elaborated on the substance of these concerns.  
In a letter to the consortium and others MiningWatch wrote: 
 
                                                 
54 Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Engagement Activity Report Q1/08” at 6, 
online: 
<http://www.share.ca/files/2008_Q1_Engagement_Report_WEB.pdf>. 
55 Supra note 49.  
56 Rights & Democracy, “Human Rights Impact Assessments for Foreign Investment Projects” (2007) at 18 – 19, 
online:  
<www.dd-rd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globalization/hria/full%20report_may_2007.pdf>.  
57 Eventually, the parties chose On Common Ground Consultants to perform the impact assessment and 
International Alert to provide peer review.  See CSRWire, “Human Rights Impact Assessment Contractors Selected 
and Website Established” (7 October 2008), online: <http://www.csrwire.com/News/13376.html>. 
58 Rights Action, “Open Letter from Rights Action to Goldcorp Inc. and Shareholders” (1 May 2008), online: 
<www.rightsaction.org/articles/Goldcorp_Open%20Letter_050108.html>. 
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The shareholder proposal...reveals a lack understanding of the ethical 
responsibility to assure that shareholder resolutions that directly impact on locally 
affected communities do not undermine the efforts these communities are 
engaged in to protect their own rights.  In short, shareholder resolutions put 
forward in Canada that will directly impact on local communities should have the 
free prior and informed consent of locally affected communities.59 
   
  The lack of locally affected communities’ approval is arguably present at two levels; first, 
the drafting of the shareholder proposal itself and second, the drafting of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) entered into by the consortium and Goldcorp.60  With respect to the latter, 
MiningWatch notes the MOU does not permit a representative from communities on the ground 
to form part of the Steering Committee supervising the impact assessment process.  As a result, 
unlike the foreign corporation and foreign investors, those whose rights are actually at stake and 
will be most impacted “have no direct role in setting the scope and the timelines of the 
assessment process, nor in selecting assessors and peer reviewers, nor in managing the 
assessment process.”61  Affected communities in San Miguel Ixtahuacan referred to this 
asymmetry as “an act of racism and discrimination.”62 
 
  As use of the shareholder proposal mechanism by socially responsible investment 
organizations has increased in the post-CBCA amendment period, there has been a 
corresponding trend in affected communities viewing proposals submitted to Canadian extractive 
firms with apprehension.  In addition to Goldcorp, other such instances include proposals 
submitted to Barrick Gold Corporation vis-à-vis its Pascua Lama mining project in Chile and to 
Alcan Inc. vis-à-vis its mining and refining project in Kashipur, India.63  At the heart of these 
examples is a tension that arises from potentially competing interests.  I return to the idea of 
“material and symbolic gain” discussed above.  The strategy of shareholder engagement entails 
the proposing group positioning the issue of concern as a matter of financial and reputational 
gain for the firm and of risk mitigation for the investor.  With respect to the latter, Engle notes: 
 
[C]orporations which violate human rights face higher insurance costs, lawsuits in 
tort and the risk of paying settlements or damages payments.  Human rights abuse 
creates a riskier political climate which can cause rioting, leading to destruction of 
corporate property and the possible nationalization of business assets.  Such risks 
                                                 
59 Correspondence from Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada to the consortium et. al. (4 December 2008) at 
1, online: <http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/Shareholder_ltr_2008-12-04.pdf> [“Coumans”]. 
60 Ibid. at 1 – 2.    
61 Ibid. at 2. 
62 Correspondence from ADISMI, Parroquía de San Miguel Ixtahuacán, the Alcaldía del Pueblo and the Mam Maya 
communities in resistance (Ágel, San José Ixcaniche, Salitre)  to the consortium et. al. (4 September 2008), online:  
<http://groups.google.com/group/GuatemalaStoveProject/browse_thread/thread/12018bd4b10f97b4> [“ADISMI et. 
al.”]. 
63 Coumans, supra note 59 at 2. 
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are not just intolerable to individual investors; they also poison the capital market 
generally and discourage efficient capital formation.  Companies which violate 
human rights laws risk investors’ assets for questionable gains.  They seek to 
externalize costs resulting in diseconomies to the detriment of the market.64    
 
In fact, establishing a nexus between the subject matter of a human rights-related 
shareholder proposal and pecuniary advantage is not solely strategic but is arguably required in 
law.  As discussed, the revised CBCA allows a shareholder proposal to be excluded where it 
“clearly appears that the proposal does not relate in a significant way to the business or affairs of 
the corporation.”65  In my view, there is actually little difference between the current and pre-
amendment tests.  While the former removes the previously enumerated categories for exclusion 
(i.e. “general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes”), the result, in 
essence, is the same.  Previously, it had to be demonstrated that the proposal was not primarily 
for the purpose of promoting an enumerated cause; thus, by inference, that it was primarily 
submitted for a reason involving the business or affairs of the corporation.  In other words, the 
amended formulation of the test would have to have been met under the previous test.   
 
By way of illustration, in 2008 Goldcorp management relied on the “does not relate in a 
significant way to the business or affairs of the corporation” provision in refusing to circulate a 
proposal from a retail investor which asked the corporation to suspend any further mine 
expansion in the Guatemalan municipalities of San Miguel Ixtahuacan and Sipakapa without first 
obtaining the informed consent of local communities.66  Unlike the consortium’s proposal, which 
specifically referenced “serious risks to shareholder value”,67 the retail investor’s proposal made 
no mention of potential financial impact. 
 
 On its face, this may not seem problematic; it is logical that investors would want to 
assess and manage human rights-related financial risk and that a proposal to the corporation 
should be cast in those terms.  However, when the subject of the proposal actually affects local 
communities (for example, it does not resonate with the agenda they are pursuing or it presents 
obstacles to their advocacy),68 the situation becomes more complex and two sets of conflicting 
interests emerge.  This tension is eloquently articulated by the San Miguel Ixtahuacan 
communities: 
                                                 
64 Eric Engle, “What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Human Rights, Shareholder Activism and SEC Reporting 
Requirements” (2006) 57 Syracuse L. Rev. 63 at 66. 
65 CBCA, supra note 13, ss. 137(5)(b.1). 
66 See Shareholder Association for Research and Education, “Shareholder Resolution Database”, online: 
<http://www.share.ca/en/node/1432> and Fredericton Peace Coalition, “Maritime Human Rights Group Seeks 
Answers from Goldcorp” (16 May 2008), online: <http://frederictonpeace.org/?p=1218>. 
67 Supra note 49. 
68 Coumans, supra note 59 at 2. 
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...[T]he...proposal does not reflect the reality of life in our communities.  
The investors’ concern for protection of our human rights remains solely at the 
level of concern.  In the end, the...proposal allows for the sacking and destruction 
of our resources to continue without any regard for our health, life and territory or 
for any other aspects of the human rights of these ancient indigenous peoples.  
... 
...[H]uman rights have nothing to do with optimizing the profits of a transnational 
company that is sacking and destroying the resources of an ancient people.69  
  
In negotiating this incongruity, it is important to remain mindful of the fact that socially 
responsible investment organizations utilizing the proposal mechanism must strive to make their 
proposals palatable to the receiving company on one hand and to their clients on the other.70  The 
former is especially important if the organization wishes to advance its cause via the dialogue 
process discussed above.  This is presumably the case given that social/human rights-related 
proposals have a slim chance of adoption if put to a vote at a shareholder meeting.  In fact, even 
if they receive a majority vote, the corporation is under no legal obligation to implement the 
recommendations of such a proposal.71   
 
While addressing potential corporate involvement in human rights-violating activities is a 
goal of socially conscious shareholder proposals, this goal is pursued only under the overarching 
umbrella of financial risk reduction.  As discussed, the governing legislative provisions arguably 
require the establishment of a financial connection.  While I, of course, appreciate the two goals 
may very well exist in harmony, the fact that the interests of affected communities may conflict 
with those of proposing investors cannot be ignored.  In the Goldcorp scenario, there is a clear 
divergence in interests; investor risk mitigation on one hand, juxtaposed against Guatemalan 
communities’ desire to end the firm’s subsidiary operations altogether.72  To date, the investor 
membership of the impact assessment Steering Committee has been dismissive of the latter 
ambition and startlingly paternalistic: 
 
...[The] Marlin mine is a reality that is not going to go away.  It is extremely 
unlikely the Guatemalan government will revoke the mining license and, most 
certainly, Goldcorp Inc. will not voluntarily close up shop and vacate the 
premises.  Given that reality, the matter of determining and resolving the current 
social and environmental impacts on the population remains unaddressed and 
unresolved.  In the judgement of the responsible investor group...the most 
                                                 
69 ADISMI et. al., supra note 62. 
70 Coumans, supra note 59 at 2. 
71 Dhir, “Realigning”, supra note 10 at 406, 402 (citations omitted). 
72 ADISMI et. al., supra note 62 (“We will demand that the company be closed down and not be given the 
opportunity to continue polluting and destroying the lands of this ancient people”). 
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appropriate means to address those impacts - the real issues the people and 
communities are experiencing every day - is a human rights impact assessment.73 
 
 
IV. SITUATING THE ISSUE WITHIN TWAIL DISCOURSE 
 
In a situation of direct conflict, the interests of locally affected communities must be 
respected.  In that regard, while I have noted that the investor-firm dialogue process may prove 
educational for management in terms of the human rights-related impacts of business operations, 
there is also much to be learned by socially responsible investment organizations as they 
continue to employ the proposal mechanism in the post-CBCA amendment period.  In particular, 
as they journey further into human rights terrain, they must familiarize themselves with relevant 
human rights discourses.   
 
Despite its lack of acknowledgement in more conventional, prevailing literature,74 
TWAIL provides both theoretical and methodological tools for dissecting transnational 
dynamics.75  As an intellectual movement, it has been described as “a broad dialectic (or large 
umbrella) of opposition to the generally unequal, unfair, and unjust character of an international 
legal regime that...helps subject the Third World to domination, subordination, and serious 
disadvantage.”76   
   
  TWAIL scholarship is still evolving and, correspondingly, various substantive areas 
remain unexplored.77  To date, the intersections of TWAIL-related concerns and corporate law 
                                                 
73 “A Summary of Issues Relevant to the Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) of Marlin Mine, Guatemala” 
(February 2009) at 6 [emphasis added], online:  
<http://cule.ca/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/hitting-back-feb-09-revised-pdf.pdf>. 
74 A. F. Sunter, “TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry” (2007) 20 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 475 at 476 (“There is almost no recognition of TWAIL in mainstream scholarship”). 
75 O.C. Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?” 
(2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371 [Okafor, “Critical”]. 
76 O.C. Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective” 
(2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 171 at 176 (citation omitted).  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide 
a complete picture of TWAIL-related scholarship.  For a very limited sample, see Makau W. Mutua, Human Rights: 
A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), Makau Mutua, “What is 
TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31, James Thuo Gathii, “Rejoinder: 
TWAILing International Law” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2066, Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty 
and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); B.S. Chimni, “Third World 
Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto” (2006) 8 International Community Law Review 3, Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
77 See J. Kangave, “‘Taxing’ TWAIL: A Preliminary Inquiry into TWAIL’s Application to the Taxation of Foreign 
Direct Investment” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 389 at 391 (“there is hardly any TWAIL 
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have not formed the subject of scholarly inquiry.  Similar to areas such as taxation, this is 
understandable when considering that corporate law and policy is often deliberated at the 
domestic – rather than the transnational – level.  However, as discussed above, the effects of a 
Western state’s corporate law provisions may be experienced far beyond the domestic realm and 
thus have the potential to assume a transnational character insofar as they impact on citizens of 
the Third World.78  In that respect, the relationship between the shareholder proposal mechanism 
and human rights abroad engages a fundamental organizing question posed by Anghie:  “How 
does a particular rule or legal regime empower or disempower people in the Third World?”79  
 
Mutua argues that contemporary human rights advocacy and discourse is characterized 
by a “damning metaphor” consisting of savages, victims and saviors.80  He asks human rights 
actors to engage in a process of critical self-reflection81 and cautions against perpetuating the 
image of agency-lacking victims82 who are rescued by Western saviors operating upon the 
tenants of liberalism.83  Despite good intentions, there is a real danger of replicating the 
dominant/submissive binary of the colonial encounter.84              
 
The act of Western, human rights-concerned shareholders submitting a proposal that may 
affect local communities in the Third World country of business operations, followed by an 
investor-corporation MOU that does not contemplate representation from affected communities 
on the body overseeing an impact assessment process, falls squarely within the metaphor that 
Mutua impugns.  The Goldcorp situation arguably has the potential to perpetuate power 
differentials, fortify race hierarchies85 and undermine the goals of autonomy and self-
determination.  Further, for those of us who identify with communitarian or so-called 
“progressive corporate law” scholarship, it runs the risk of qualifying the possible contribution of 
corporate law to the overall human rights project and of replicating the failures of other 
seemingly well-intentioned discourses, such as development.86 
                                                                                                                                                             
literature exploring the relationship between the Westphalian civilising mission and taxation”) and I. T. Odumosu, 
“Challenges for the (Present/) Future of Third World Approaches to International Law” (2008) 10 International 
Community Law Review 467 at 476 – 477. 
78 Kangave, ibid. at 391, 392 (citations omitted). 
79 A. Anghie, “TWAIL: Past and Future” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 479 at 480. 
80 Makau W. Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal 201 at 201.   
81 Ibid. at 202. 
82 Ibid. at 203. 
83 Ibid. at 204. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. at 207. 
86 R. Buchanan, “Writing Resistance Into International Law” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 445 
at 447. 
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TWAIL-centered approaches focus on “global processes of marginalization and 
domination that impact on the lives and struggles of third world peoples.”87  An investment 
activism strategy that is informed by TWAIL-discourse would take great pains not to hinder the 
advocacy efforts of locally affected communities.88  To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that 
overarching investor concerns of risk mitigation will necessarily run counter to these advocacy 
efforts; rather, that the potential for dissonance exists.  In order to avoid such conflict, Western 
shareholders of transnational corporations must engage in a process of critical internal analysis in 
an effort to formulate an investment blueprint that is mindful of its own constraints, does not 
exploit power dynamics and is credible and inclusive from the perspective of those who will be 
directly affected by it.89  Such an approach would not consist of “an uncritical privileging of 
stories of essentialised Third World peoples”, but would involve a significant, mindful 
examination of how the shareholder proposal contemplated “relates to human suffering in 
particular places.”90   
 
In undertaking their own reflexive “assessment process” going forward, shareholders 
must give specific consideration to whether the proposal contemplated has the potential to 
impact local communities and to frustrate their stated political objectives.  At a minimum, this 
would include consulting with these communities in the design of a shareholder proposal, 
ensuring community representation on bodies overseeing any impact assessment initiatives and 
ensuring prior free and informed consent.  Anything less threatens the legitimacy of the 
proposal/impact assessment process91 and serves to perpetuate the “civilizing mission”.92  
Indeed, the response of the impact assessment Steering Committee’s investor membership to 
concerns regarding the assessment process is replete with ‘civilizing’ discourse, presuming that 
its “judgement” can best identify “the most appropriate means to address... the real issues the 
people and communities are experiencing every day.”93 
                                                 
87 TWAIL Vision Statement, as quoted in Karin Mickelson, “Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories” (2008) 10 
International Community Law Review 355 at 357. 
88 I, of course, do not mean to suggest that TWAIL voices are a monolith.  Rather, they are varied and address a 
range of interests, but are also connected by a “unifying core”.  Okafor, “Critical”, supra note 75 at 375 – 376. 
89 Anghie notes that such a self-reflective process is essential for the TWAIL movement itself:: “TWAIL 
scholarship...needs to be self-critical, aware of the limitations of its own analytic framework, and the voices it has 
excluded and suppressed.”  A. Anghie, “What is TWAIL: Comment” (2000) 94 American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 39.   
90 Pooja Parmar, “TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry” (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 363 at 
365 (citation omitted). 
91 For a similar point, in the context of unilateral home state regulation of corporate activity, see S. L. Seck, 
“Unilateral Home State Regulation: Imperialism or Tool for Subaltern Resistance?” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 565 at 601 (“the legitimacy of unilateral home state regulation is likely to be greater if the structure of the 
regulation gives voice to [subaltern] communities”). 
92 This term is employed by numerous academics writing from a TWAIL perspective to “refer to the different 
methods employed by the West to justify intervention in the affairs of Non-western societies/“the Other”.”  See 
Kangave, supra note 77 at 390, n. 6 (citation omitted). 
93 Supra note 73. 
  
16                                                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES                                            [VOL. 05 NO. 02
 
  A TWAIL-versed plan of action would recognize and respect enduring community 
struggles that are undertaken with great peril.94  It would entail establishing continuing linkages 
with local civil society groups and not only conducting on-the-ground consultations with 
stakeholders (as done by the consortium),95 but ensuring that investment initiatives concerning 
local communities (and necessitating their involvement) have community support and a role for 
long-term community oversight.  In addition to confirming local legitimacy, such efforts will 
prevent transnational firms from agreeing to the course of action suggested in a shareholder 
proposal merely in order to temporarily ease the pressures of human rights-related advocacy and 
to simultaneously reap the benefits of positive publicity.96   
 
I am not arguing that shareholder proposals must always actively advance community 
desires.  For example, it is legitimate for a proposal to seek a report from the company 
investigating and articulating potential human rights-related risks associated with Third World 
operations.  Such a proposal does not call on the firm to cease operations altogether and, as such, 
may not reflect the demands of local stakeholders.  However, unlike the consortium’s proposal, it 
does not thwart the advancement of those demands, require local community participation or 
exclude local communities from supervising processes that directly impact them.  In other words, 
it is a proposal that meets the simple, but essential test of “do[ing] no harm.”97  On this point, I 
appreciate and agree with MiningWatch’s concern that proposals which are seemingly innocuous 
can actually have detrimental repercussions.  However, I see this example as different from the 
ones it references (e.g. commissioning reports measuring project backing, enhancing methods of 
local consultation etc.), which are more conducive to allowing target corporations to simply bask 
in the light of reputational advancement.98  Most importantly, as a general rule, if a particular 
project has garnered noteworthy levels of community resistance, rights-concerned investors 
should be reticent to submit a proposal which may run antithetical to communities’ stated 
goals.99  
 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The aftermath of the consortium’s proposal reflects many of the problems identified 
above.  Guatemala’s Catholic Church has begun a rival impact assessment process, viewed as 
                                                 
94 Coumans, supra note 59 at 2. 
95 Supra note 50. 
96 Coumans, supra note 59 at 2. 
97 Ibid. at 3. 
98 Ibid.    
99 Ibid. 
2009]            SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT IN THE EMBEDDED BUSINESS CORPORATION             17 
 
more inclusive and independent.  Noted human rights scholar Douglas Cassel is collaborating 
with the Church after refusing to participate in the consortium/Goldcorp process on account of 
concerns relating to its independence.100  Further, the Public Service Alliance of Canada Staff 
Pension Fund, an original consortium member, recently withdrew from the process citing inter 
alia the absence of informed consent on the part of local indigenous peoples.101 
   
In some respects, the removal of the previously enumerated CBCA restrictions, and the 
increased use of the proposal mechanism in the post amendment period, can be seen as part of a 
broader movement towards a reflexive, “new governance” approach.  Given the constraints of 
traditional regulatory models and conventional legal frameworks, the new governance project 
seeks, in part, to transcend traditional punitive/deterrence-based measures102 and to focus instead 
on norm generation and the enhancement of “internal self-regulatory capacities”.103  While this 
may not involve the direct regulation of corporate conduct with societal implications,104 part of 
the goal is to empower non-governmental actors (such as shareholders).  In that respect, the 
approach is participatory and democratic, involving an important role for multiple societal 
segments.105 
  While these are laudable objectives, I am also mindful of the embeddedness discussion 
that begins this chapter and am uneasy with some of the new governance literature that seems to 
celebrate the notion of the decentred state.106  Seck cautions that when the state puts itself on the 
                                                 
100 Correspondence from Catherine Coumans, MiningWatch Canada to the consortium et. al. (16 March 2009) at 1, 
online: 
<http://www.rightsaction.org/articles/Goldcorp_ongiong_concern_32409.html >. 
101 Bill Law, “Canada Goldmine Worries Grow” BBC News (30 March 2009), online:  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7968888.stm> 
102 David Hess, “Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Stakeholder 
Accountability through Transparency” (2007) 17:3 Business Ethics Quarterly 453 at 453 [Hess, “New Governance 
Regulation”].  
103 Orly Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Review 342 at 365.  See also Bradley C. Karkkainen, ““New Governance” In 
Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping” (2004) 89 Minnesota Law 
Review 471 at 473 (“This scholarship endeavors simultaneously to chronicle, interpret, analyze, theorize, and 
advocate a seismic reorientation in both the public policymaking process and the tools employed in policy 
implementation.  The valence of this reorientation…is generally away from the familiar model of command-style, 
fixed-rule regulation by administrative fiat, and toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, 
adaptive, problem-solving New Governance.”).   
104 David Hess, “Public Pensions and the Promise of Shareholder Activism for the Next Frontier of Corporate 
Governance: Sustainable Economic Development” (2007) 2:2 Virginia Law and Business Review 221 at 234. 
105 Hess, “New Governance Regulation”, supra note 102 at 455.   
106 Adam Crawford, “Networked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?” (2006) 10:4 Theoretical Criminology 
449 at 458 (“I believe it would be foolish to ‘throw out the state’ with the governance or governmentality bath 
water...we should not get carried away with ‘a giddy sense at the moment among many intellectuals that the state is 
passe´’”) (citations omitted). 
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same footing as other interested parties, there is a risk that it will abdicate its governmental 
responsibilities.107  This concern is especially consequential when dealing with situations where 
there is an imbalance of power amongst stakeholders.  There is the danger, for example, that 
global corporations (or, in this case, corporations acting in concert with activist investors) will 
usurp processes and unduly influence corporate accountability discourse.108   
Along these lines, there could be an important role for the state to play in overseeing the 
proposal process and ensuring its equity.109  While I appreciate that an essential component of 
the TWAIL project is unpacking the traditional centrality of the state, I also note that the state “is 
not dismissed”110 and that TWAIL literature does not abandon the idea of statehood in its 
entirety.111  As argued by Chimni, “there is the lack of a “public” voice in the emergence of 
corporate law without a State.”112 Elsewhere, I have argued in favour of the establishment of an 
ad-hoc review panel.113  While there appears to be little political will for such a panel, I see a 
possible role for the “Office of the Extractive Sector CSR Counsellor” recently created by the 
Canadian government, though I admittedly view this Office as largely impotent given its 
inability to issue compulsory recommendations or conduct formal mediations.114   
Shareholder proposals provide a useful lens through which to view the embeddedness of 
economic behaviour in social relations.  As socially responsible investment organizations move 
forward with their advocacy, they must develop fluency in relevant human rights discourses such 
as TWAIL and must ensure that the processes they advocate are legitimate and inclusive vis-à-vis 
locally affected communities and do not undermine their stated political goals. 
 
                                                 
107 S. L. Seck, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) 11 Yale 
Human Rights & Development Law Journal 177at 184, n. 35 (citations omitted).   
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110 Buchanan, supra note 86 at 447. 
111 Kangave, supra note 77 at 397 (citation omitted). 
112 Chimni, supra note 76 at 13. 
113 Dhir, “Realigning”, supra note 10 at 401 – 402.  
114 Government of Canada, “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy 
for the Canadian International Extractive Sector” (March 2009) at 10 – 11, online:  
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/CSR-March2009.pdf>.  The 
creation of this Office is a particular disappointment given the recommendations of the Advisory Group Report 
arising from the “National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Industry in 
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